Abstract. We introduce generalized quantifiers, as defined in Tarskian semantics by Mostowski and Lindström, in logics whose semantics is based on teams instead of assignments, e.g., IF-logic and Dependence logic. Both the monotone and the non-monotone case is considered.
Introduction
Dependencies appear in many guises in both formal and natural languages. Several logical systems have been constructed bringing such quantifer scope dependencies to the forefront of the syntactical construction, but none of these handle generalized quantifiers, one of the basic tools in logic, descriptive complexity theory, and formal linguistics. The purpose of this paper is to introduce generalized quantifiers in these logical frameworks in such a way that branching, i.e. non linearity, of generalized quantifiers can be handled naturally in the logic itself.
Dependence logic, proposed by Väänänen [22] , is an elegant way of introducing dependencies between variables into the object language. It can also deal with branching of existential and universal quantifiers, but so far it cannot handle generalized quantifiers. In this paper we present a way of extending Dependence logic with generalized quantifiers. taking isomorphic images. For example, the meaning of the determiner most is commonly the type 1, 1 quantifier most = { (M, A, B) : | A ∩ B| ≥ |A \ B| } .
Thus, a possible formalization of the proposition "most boys are tall" is most x, y (Bx, T y)
where B is the predicate of being a boy and T that one of being tall. The truth condition for this proposition is then (M, B, T ) most x, y (Bx, T y) iff (M, B, T ) ∈ most iff |B ∩ T | ≥ |B \ T |, which seems to coincide with the intuitive truth condition for the proposition. Note that we are subscribing to the sloppy style of not distinguishing between the predicate symbols and the predicates, e.g., in the above truth condition B stands for both the predicate symbol in the formula and a subset of the domain.
Given a generalized quantifier Q of type n 1 , . . . , n k and a domain M , let the local quantifer Q M be defined as
Observe that local quantifiers are just sets of relations over the domain M , they are not generalized quantifiers in the strict sense. Generalized quantifiers in the strict sense we sometimes call global when need is to distinguish them from local quantifiers.
1.2.
Dependence and independence in natural languages. In [11] Hintikka claims that the proposition ( * ) Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsmen hate each other. ought to be interpreted as ∀x∃y ∀z∃w A(x, y, z, w)
where A(x, y, z, w) is the quantifier free formula expressing that if x is a villager and z is a townsman then y is a relative of x, w is a relative of z, and y and w hate each other, and ∀x∃y ∀z∃w is the partially ordered quantifier studied by Henkin in [10] , whose semantics is easiest expressed by its skolemization: ∃f, g∀x, z A(x, f (x), z, g(z)), thus y = f (x) may only depend on the value of x and w = g(z) only on z.
However this interpretation of ( * ) in terms of the branching Henkin quantifier has been strongly objected to (see for example Barwise [3] and Gierasimczuk and Szymanik [8] ) and other more natural examples of branching have been given, such as Barwise's example from [3] ( †) Most of the dots and most of the stars are all connected by lines. It should be rather clear, we think, that one natural reading of this is that there is a set of stars A which includes most stars, and a set B of dots including most dots, such that each star in A is connected to each dot in B. That is the branching reading of the sentence. Branching here means that the choice of the set of stars may not depend on the choice of any particular dot in the earlier chosen set of dots.
It seems hard to find natural examples in natural languages of branching involving only the first order quantifiers ∃ and ∀. Examples involving generalized quantifiers as in ( †) above is easier to find. Another example of when branching reading is natural is with numerical quantifiers as in the following example from Davies [5] .
(+) Two examiners marked six scripts. Maybe the most natural reading of (+) is
where E is the predicate of being an examiner, S that of being a script, and M (x, y) the relation of x marking y. The numerical quantifiers ∃ =k are, even though definable in first order logic, proper generalized quantifiers.
To be able to handle branching readings of sentences like ( * ) in a coherent logical framework Hintikka developed Independence Friendly logic, or IF-logic for short, in which statements of the form "there exists x, chosen independently ofȳ, such that" can be expressed by the formal construction
Hereȳ is a finite sequence of variable y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y n−1 . We say that ∃x/ȳ is a slashed quantifier. However IF-logic, as it stands, cannot handle generalized quantifiers, the chief example of branching in natural languages. This paper introduces generalized quantifiers in IF-logic, and many of its variants such as Dependence Friendly logic (DF-logic) and Dependence logic.
Barwise (see [3] ), among others, argues that for monotone 1 quantifiers Q 1 and Q 2 of type 1 the branching of Q 1 and Q 2
should be interpreted as
where Br(Q 1 , Q 2 ) is the type 2 quantifier
We take this as the definition of branching of two monotone quantifiers. The correctness of that definition seems to be rather universally agreed upon. Thus, our definition of quantifiers in DF-logic should reflect upon this. It could be worth noting that for monotone quantifiers Q 1 and Q 2 a formula Q 1 x Q 2 y ϕ can be translated into existiential second-order logic with Q 1 and Q 2 used as second-order predicates in the following way:
In this formula it is clear that the second-order variable Y depends on the firstorder variable x. By moving the ∃Y outside of the scope of ∀x ∈ X we can break this dependence. The resulting formula then becomes:
which is equivalent to the branching reading: Br(Q 1 , Q 2 )xy ϕ, giving some evidence on the correctness of the definition of Br(Q 1 , Q 2 ).
In the next section we will define both IF-logic and DF-logic, but first take a look at another variant of IF-logic developed by Väänänen [22] called Dependence logic.
1.3.
Dependence logic and related logics. The syntax of Dependence logic is that of first order logic together with new atoms, the dependence atoms. There is one dependence atom for each arity written [t 1 , . . . , t n →t n+1 ].
2 For simplicity we will assume that all formulas are written in negation normal form, i.e., all negation signs occuring in a formula occur in front of an atomic formula. This is to make some technicalities easier, the downside of this approach is that negation cannot be treated in a compositional way. More on this later. Note also that negation in Dependence logic is not contradictory negation as; for example, we will see later that ∀x,
To define a compositional semantics for Dependence logic we need to consider sets of assignments called teams. Formally, an assignment is a function s : V → M where V is a finite set of variables and M is the domain under discussion. A team (on the domain M ) is a set of assignments of some fixed finite set of variables V , i.e., a subset of { s | s : V → M } for some finite set of variables V . If V = ∅ there is only one assignment V → M , the empty assignment, denoted by ǫ. Please observe that the team of the empty assignment { ǫ } is different from the empty team.
Given an assignment s : V → M and a ∈ M let s[a/x] : V ∪ { x } → M be the assignment:
The domain of a (non-empty) team dom(X) is the set of variables V . The condition M, X ϕ means that the formula ϕ of Dependence logic is satisfied in the structure M by the team X. We use the notation M, s ϕ for ordinary Tarskian satisfaction of the first order formula ϕ under the assignment s. We call this type of semantics where a formula is satisfied by a team, not just a single assignment, Hodges semantics 3 to distinguish it from ordinary Tarskian semantics. The truth conditions for M, X ϕ are the following:
Here t M,s is the interpretation of the term t in the model M under the assignment
of assignments, and when ever f : The free variables of a formula is defined in a recursively way, like in first order logic, with the extra base case of the dependence atom: all the variables inx and y are free in the formula [x→y] . Let FV(ϕ) be the set of free variables of ϕ. A sentence is a formula without free variables. We define M σ for a sentence σ to hold if M, { ǫ } σ.
By just staring at the definition of satisfaction we can make some remarks. First, every formula is satisfied by the empty team, which has as a consequence that for any atomic formula ϕ we have both M, ∅ ϕ and M, ∅ ¬ϕ. Second, satisfaction is preserved under taking subteams:
The next proposition might seem a bit ad hoc at first sight, but its role will later be apparent. It tells us that the truth condition for the existential quantifier is equivalent to the truth condition we later introduce for generalized quantifiers.
Recall that ∃ M is the local existential quantifier, i.e., the set of non-empty predicates on M :
Naturally, the semantic value of a formula in Dependence logic is the set of teams satisfying the formula. Definition 1.3. The semantic value ϕ M of a formula ϕ in the model M is the set of teams satisfying it:
Here we have chosen one of two possible paths, the other one would be to define the semantic value of a formula to be the pair of the set of teams satisfying the formula and the set of teams that satisfy the negation of the formula: ϕ M , ϕ ¬ M , where ϕ ¬ is the formula in negated normal form that corresponds to ¬ϕ. That would have had the advantage of making negation compositional (i.e., a function of semantic values). However, it would also make the theory technically much more involved.
It should also be pointed out that Kontinen and Väänänen in [14] proved that if ϕ and ψ are formulas in Dependence logic with the same free variables such that ϕ M ∩ ψ M = { ∅ } then there is a formula σ in Dependence logic such that σ M = ϕ M and σ ¬ M = ψ M . Thus the "positive" and the "negative" semantic values, taken to be ϕ M and ϕ ¬ M respectively, of formulas are independent, in the sense that only knowing the positive (negative) semantic value of a formula does not give any information on the negative (positive) semantic value of the same formula.
DF-logic has a different syntax than Dependence logic but a similar semantics. Instead of introducing dependence atoms we introduce new quantifiers 4 ∃x\ȳ wherē y is a finite sequence of variables. We call ∃x\ȳ a backslashed quantifier. ∃x\ȳ ϕ has the same truth condition as
Independence friendly logic, IF-logic, is syntactically similar to DF-logic but with slashed quantifiers instead of backslashed ones. 5 There is a non-compositional translation of IF-logic into Dependence logic: Given a sentence σ in IF-logic we replace each occurrence of ∃x/ȳ ϕ by
wherez are the variables occurring in σ but not inȳ.
These three logics, IF-, DF-and Depedence logic, are all equivalent in the sense that for each formula in one of the logics there are formulas in the other logics satisfied by the same teams in the same structures. The translations from DF-logic to Dependence logic and back are compositional, but the translations to and from IF-logic is not.
IF-logic has one rather strange property which Dependence logic and DF-logic does not. In IF-logic an extra variable could be used for "signaling" as in the following example:
Thus quantifying over variables not occurring in a sentence might change the truth value of that sentence. This is rather counterintuitive, which should give us a slight preference for DF-logic and Dependence logic over IF-logic. 4 Observe that these quantifiers are not generalized quantifiers in the sense of Lindström and Mostowski since they are defined using Hodges semantics, not Tarskian semantics. 5 In fact, what we describe here is, strictly speaking, what Hodges in [13] calls slash logic and not IF-logic.
Generalized quantifiers
We will now give a rather long argumentation leading up to Definition 2.3 which gives truth conditions for generalized quantifiers in logics whose semantics are given in the framework of teams, such as Dependence logic. As will be apparent later, if a generalized quantifier is definable in existential second order logic, ESO, the result of adding the quantifier to Dependence logic will not change the strength of the logic, it will still be of the same strength as ESO. However, the translation into ESO will not be compositional, see the discussion in Section 4. The main reason for introducing generalized quantifiers in this framework is not to gain strength, but to give a compositional explanation of branching.
In the following we fix a structure and let M ambiguously denote it and its domain. We will ambiguously use Q to denote both a global quantifier and the local version on M , which really should be denoted by Q M . We write ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ M .
Teams are sets of assignments, and thus not relations, however if X is a team
be the relation on M we get by applying the assignments in X to the tuple
We will be quite sloppy in distinguishing between teams and relations, instead identifying the team X with the relation X(x) wherex is dom(X) listed with the indices in increasing order, and R with [R/x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ] where k is the arity of R.
In [1] Abramsky and Väänänen give an argument for the correctness of the truth conditions for ∀ and ∃ in Hodges semantics. In short the argument goes as follows: First they show that Hodges semantics is a special case of a more general construction, that of the free commutative quantale. Second, they show that the truth conditions of the quantifiers in Hodges semantics are the image under this general construction of the usual Tarskian truth conditions. Let us see how this works.
Start off by letting the Hodges space be
where L(X) is the set of order ideals, 6 or down sets, of the ordered set X and P(M n ) is the power set of M n ordered by set inclusion. Given a formula with n free variables in Dependence logic the set of relations corresponding to the teams satisfying the formula is an element of H(M n ), we therefore think of H(M n ) as the set of possible semantic values of formulas. 7 Since the elements of H(M n ) are all closed downwards we restrict ourselves, at the moment, to logics where satisfaction is closed under taking subteams. Note that ∅ is a down set and thus an element of H(M n ). 6 Order ideals are sets closed downwards, i.e., I ⊆ P(M n ) is an order ideal if for every A ⊆ M n and any B ∈ I such that B ⊆ A B ∈ I. 7 Observe that not all elements of H(M n ) are semantic values of formulas in Dependence logic, see [14] for a complete characterization of elements of H(M n ) which are.
If we reformulate the truth conditions for ∃ and ∀ in algebraic terms as operations mapping semantic values in H(M n+1 ) to semantics values in H(M n ) we get the following. The Hodges quantifiers ∃ H and ∀ H are families of functions
The truth condition for the existential quantifier can now be restated as:
whereȳ are the free variables of ∃xϕ. The corresponding equality is of course true also for the universal quantifier. Let us now see that these truth conditions are forced upon us by the operation L.
Given a function h : P(A) → P(B) we define the Hodges lift of that function as:
where ↓X is the downward closure of X , i.e.,
To every generalized quantifier Q of type 1 there is a corresponding function on the Tarskian semantic values:
where Rā = { b | ā, b ∈ R }. Now the truth condition for ∃ and ∀ in the Hodges setting is just the image under L of the truth conditions for ∃ and ∀ in the Tarskian setting, in the sense that: ∃ H = L(h∃), and ∀ H = L(h∀). These facts follow easily from the definitions, but see Proposition 2.4. We do not have to stop here. Let us see what happens if we start with some other quantifier Q of type 1 and argue in the same way that led us to the truth conditions for ∃ and ∀ in the Hodges setting. Thus, for a generalized quantifier Q,
is also a down set.
Proof. (a) Follows from the fact that
Proposition 2.2. For any Q of type 1 and any X ∈ H(M k ) we have
Proof. Follows directly from the lemma whenever ∅ / ∈ Q. On the other hand if
depending on whatever X is the empty set or not.
This all leads up to the following truth condition:
Definition 2.3. Let Q be a monotone generalized quantifiers Q of type 1 and ϕ some formula in a logic whose semantics is based on teams. We define what it means for the team X to satisfy the formula ϕ by the following truth condition.
This applies even for non-monotone quantifiers but for those quantifiers Q the truth condition above does not make a whole lot of sense as the following example shows. Let M = N and Q = { A } where A is the set of even numbers. According to the truth condition above M,
For this reason let us, for now, restrict the definitions to monotone quantifiers. We do not however need to restrict to type 1 as the definition easily can be extended to all quantifiers of type k :
The following easy proposition suggests that we indeed have the right truth condition, at least for monotone quantifiers of type 1 . Given some language L let L(Q) the set of first order formulas in that language extended with the generalized quantifier Q. Proposition 2.4. Below, let Q be a monotone quantifier of type 1 .
(
is just the ordinary composition of functions (observe that this equality is really an infinite conjunction of equalities since L(Q) is a family of functions).
Proof.
(1) The right-to-left inclusion is immediate using Proposition 2.2. The other inclusion follows from the fact that if
(2) Any function F : X → ∀ has to be the constant function taking s to M .
The argument is an induction on the formula ϕ, the only non trivial case being when ϕ is Qxψ. If M, X Qxψ then there is a function F : X → Q such that M, X[F/x] ψ, which means that for each s ∈ X there is a set
By the monotonicity of Q we have ψ M,s ∈ Q and thus that M, s Qxψ for every s ∈ X. For the other direction suppose M, s Qxψ for every s ∈ X, and let F (s) be ψ M,s .
(4) Follows directly from (3). (5) By unwinding the definitions we get
The left to right inclusion in the last equality comes from the fact that if such F and G exist then we can define H(s) to be as long as X is non-empty. 9 This is counterintuitive since the sentence Qx([→x] ∧ x = x) should be equivalent to Qx x = x. There are also problems with the notion of definability as the next example shows Assume that Q is definable by a first order sentence σ with P as the only unary predicate. This means that
for all first order formulas ϕ such that no free variables of ϕ occur in σ. 10 It would be natural to think that σ also defines Q in Dependence logic. However if Q = ∃ ≥2 , σ is ∃x∃y(x = y ∧ P x ∧ P y),
Thus, introducing dependence atoms into the language seems to destroy nice properties of the logic. However, we think that the dependence atom should take the blame for this, and not the truth condition for the generalized quantifier.
There are two different solutions for handling dependencies in the setting with generalized quantifiers. Either one redefines the dependence atom, or one skips dependence as an atomic property altogether and define slashed and/or backslashed versions of the generalized quantifiers, very much as is done in DF-and IF-logic. Let us start with the latter suggestion and postpone the definition of a new dependence atom until section 3. 
We also define M, X Qx/ȳ ϕ in the obvious way: iff there exists
Let us denote first order logic with the generalized quantifiers Q by SBL(Q) when we allow both slashed and backslashed versions of the quantifiers ∃, ∀, and Q. Note that we can translate backslashed quantifiers into formulas where we only allow slashed ones, and vice versa. However, these translations are not compositional and therefore we include both slashed and backslashed quantifiers in the logic SBL(Q). for every down set X , making this new definition of ∃x\ȳ compatible with the old one. Also, it is easy to see that both conditions are equivalent to the corresponding sentence in Dependence logic: Proposition 2.7. Let Q be a monotone quantifier of type k and ϕ a formula in
Let Q 1 and Q 2 be monotone quantifiers of type k and l respectively, then
The next proposition states that Q 1x Q 2ȳ /x has the intended meaning Br(Q 1 , Q 2 ) Proposition 2.8. If Q 1 and Q 2 are monotone quantifiers of type k and l respectively, then
where ϕ is in SBL(Q 1 , Q 2 ).
Proof. To simplify notation we only prove this in the case that k = l = 1. Assume that M, X Br(Q 1 , Q 2 )xy ϕ, i.e., there if H : 
2.2.
Non-monotone quantifiers. The truth condition for monotone quantifiers cannot be extended to non-monotone quantifiers as we have previously seen. However, with a slight twist the truth condition can actually be extended.
In the Tarskian setting we say that M Qxϕ iff ϕ ∈ Q. When Q is monotone (increasing) this is equivalent to demanding that there is some set A ⊆ ϕ such that A ∈ Q, a fact we used for the truth conditions in the Hodges setting. When dealing with non-monotone quantifiers Q we need, apart from that there is a set A ⊆ ϕ such that A ∈ Q, also that it is the largest set satisfying A ⊆ ϕ .
Translating this into the Hodges setting we need to say not only that M, X[F/x] ϕ but also that F is a maximal function for which this holds. However, there might not be a maximal F such that X[F/x] satisfies ϕ. Instead we demand that there should be one F such that X[F/x] satisfies ϕ and such that every larger F such that X[F/x] also satisfies ϕ is mapping X into Q. Let us try to formalize this in the following definition:
We call the second condition on F the largeness condition since it forces the function F to take large sets as values.
This definition generalizes to other types of quantifiers as in the case of monotone quantifiers. If Q is of type k then M, X Qxϕ iff there is F : X → P(M k ) satisfying (slight variants of) the two conditions above.
This largeness condition we have added is quite similar to Sher's maximality principle for the branching of non-monotone quantifiers, see [21] . However, as we will see, the above condition gives rise to a slightly stronger notion of branching than the one proposed by Sher.
We can clearly add this largeness condition to slashed and backslashed nonmonotone quantifiers: M, X Qx/ȳ ϕ if there is a witness F : X → P(M ) to M, X Qxϕ where F is independent of the values ofȳ. Observe here that demanding F to be a witness for the statement M, X Qx ϕ means that F is large with respect to all functions F ′ : X → P(M ) and not only those that are determined by the values ofȳ. We define M, X Qx\ȳ ϕ in a similar manner. Proposition 2.10. For Q monotone the truth condition with the largeness condition in Definition 2.9 is equivalent to the old condition without the largeness condition.
Proof. Obvious since if there is F : X → Q and F ′ ≥ F then F ′ (s) ∈ Q for all s ∈ X by the monotonicity of Q.
Proof. The proof is by induction. We only need to check the induction step for the quantifier Q. Assume M, X Qxϕ. Let F be such that X[F/x] ϕ and satisfying the largeness condition, and let s ∈ X. By the induction hypothesis we have that for all a ∈ F (s): M, s[a/x] ϕ. Therefore F (s) ⊆ ϕ M,s and by the largeness condition on F we know that ϕ M,s ∈ Q M and therefore M, s Qxϕ.
On the other hand if for all s ∈ X : M, s ϕ, then we let F (s) = ϕ M,s . It is clear that F (s) ∈ Q M for all s ∈ X and also that there cannot be any 
Proof. Suppose not and let A 0 be the union of all A 0 × B 0 is maximal in R by construction, hence R ∈ Br S (Q 1 , Q 2 ) contradicting the assumption. Proposition 2.14. Suppose that ϕ is such that ϕ is closed downwards (ϕ could for example be a formula of L(Q) or of Dependence logic). If M, X Q 1 xQ 2 y/xϕ then M, X Br S (Q 1 , Q 2 )xyϕ.
Proof. Assume that M, X Q 1 xQ 2 y/xϕ, i.e., that there are F, G : X → P(M ) satisfying the relevant largeness condition. To prove that M, X Br S (Q 1 , Q 2 )xyϕ we need to find an H : X → P(M 2 ) witnessing the truth condition. Let H(s) = F (s) × G(s). We need to prove that (1) M, X[H/xy] ϕ and (2) that for any
for some s 0 ∈ X. By the lemma we either have A / ∈ Q 1 such that
First assume that we have such a B. Then G does not satisfy the largeness condition, i.e., that for every
On the other hand suppose we have such an A and let F ′ be as F except that
We also need to prove that G satisfies the largeness condition. Let
/y] ϕ and since G satisfies the largeness condition for X[F/x] we know that G ′ (s) ∈ Q 2 for all s ∈ X, proving the largeness condition for G with
We leave the question as wether the proposition holds for general formulas ϕ open. Question 1. Is Proposition 2.14 also true for formulas ϕ such that ϕ is not a down set?
The implication in the other direction is in general false as the following example shows. Let R = { 0, 0 } ∪ { 0, 1 } × { 1, 2 } where 0, 1, 2 ∈ M , see Figure 1 . Then
since to get (M, R), A × B R(x, y), A ∈ ∃ =1 and B = ∅, we are forced to choose A = { 0 } or A = { 1 }. But then the largeness condition for A is not satisfied.
This example also shows that in general the two quantifier prefixes Q 1 xQ 2 y/x and Q 2 yQ 1 x/y are not equivalent:
We end this section with two open questions regarding this pathology. (1) for monotone quantifiers the truth conditions coincide with the ones for the monotone case, (2) for formulas of L(Q) we have M, X ϕ iff for all s ∈ X: M, s ϕ, and (3) the prefixes Q 1 xQ 2 y/x and Q 2 yQ 1 x/y are equivalent?
Our proposed truth conditions satisfy (1) and (2), but not (3).
Dependence as an atom
Let us now investigate the possibility of defining a new dependence atom D(x, y) giving the intended meaning Qy\x ϕ to expressions of the form Qy(D(x, y) ∧ ϕ). First we observe that there is no way of doing this if we want to keep the property of the logic being closed under taking subteams. The following argument shows this.
Assume that D(x, y) is an atom closed under subteams satisfying that
Thus, X = [M 2 /x, y] has to satisfy D(x, y). By the downward closure of D, we have that the team
satisfies the atom D and thus that
This argument shows that no atom D(x, y) closed under taking subteams can have the intended effect on both the quantifiers ∃ ≥2 and ∃ ≥3 . However, by abandoning the property that truth is closed under subteams we can define an atom satisfying the right equivalences. To get the mind on the right track let us go back and take a look at the formula Q 1 x Q 2 y ϕ and its translation into existential second order logic with Q 1 and Q 2 as second order predicates:
In this translation it is clear that the variable Y depends on the variable x. Thus a quantifier prefix like Q 1 x Q 2 y gives rise to a dependence in which the value of x determines the set Y of possible values for y. The new dependence atom, which we denote by [x 1 . . . , x k ։x k+1 ], tries to capture this type of dependence in which the set of possible values of x k+1 is determined by the values of the variables x 1 , . . . , x k . We formalize this idea, but first we need a little bit of notation to work with.
Let Xȳ s , for s ⊆ s ′ ∈ X andȳ ∈ dom(X), be the set of possible values ofȳ given s, in other words:
As an example let X be as in (1) and s :
In fact, this is functional dependence for set-valued functions: Assume that we want to check whether M, X [x։ȳ] or not. Let F map s ∈ X↾x,z to the set of possible values ofȳ, Xȳ s . Then M, X [x։ȳ] iff F (s) is determined by the values s(x).
Next we give an equivalent definition for [x։ȳ] this time as a first order property of X.
where {z } = dom(X) \ {x,ȳ }.
Clearly s(ȳ) ∈ Xȳ s↾xz and thus s(ȳ) ∈ Xȳ s ′ ↾xz which means that there is s 0 ∈ X such that s 0 ⊇ s ′ ↾xz and s 0 (ȳ) = s(ȳ), i.e., that s 0 (x,z) = s ′ (x,z) and s 0 (ȳ) = s(ȳ).
For the other implication let s ∈ X, we show that Xȳ s↾x = Xȳ s↾x,z . It should be clear that Xȳ s↾x ⊇ Xȳ s↾x,z , so letā ∈ Xȳ s↾x . Then there is s ′ ∈ X such that s ′ ⊇ s↾x and s ′ (ȳ) =ā. By assumption there is a s 0 ∈ X such that s 0 (x,ȳ) = s ′ (x,ȳ) and s 0 (z) = s(z), or in other words s 0 ⊇ s↾x,z and s 0 (ȳ) =ā, i.e., thatā ∈ Xȳ s↾x,z .
The dependence relation [x։ȳ] is what database theorists call multivalued dependence, see [4] .
By some easy calculations we find that any X satisfying both 
It should also be noted that in the case of functional dependence the dependence atom is not dependent on context in the sense that 
. There is a close connection between lossless decomposition of databases and multivalued dependencies: Let X ⊲⊳ Y be the natural join of the teams X and Y , i.e., In this case, when dom(Y ) and dom(Z) are disjoint, the natural join of Y and Z is nothing more than the cartesian product.
Next we prove that the functional dependence may be replaced be multivalued dependence in a certain well-behaved syntactical fragment of Dependence logic. This fragment is as expressive as full Dependence logic at the level of sentences. The truth definition of M, X [x։y] is first order in X, see Proposition 3.3, and thus for every formula ϕ in MVDL there is a sentence σ(R) in ESO such that M, X ϕ iff (M, X) σ(R).
That means that MVDL is at most as strong as existential second order logic (when it comes to sentences) and thus as Dependence logic. Also, by translating sentences of Dependence logic into normal sentences and then replacing the functional dependence atom with the multivalued dependence atom we get a sentence of MVDL which is equivalent to the original Dependence logic sentence. Thus, MVDL, Dependence logic and ESO are all of the same strength on the level of sentences.
Recently Galliani proved that MVDL is exactly as strong as existential second order logic also on the level of formulas: Proposition 3.8 ( [7] ). Let X be a set of teams on a model M , then the following are equivalent:
• There is a formula ϕ of MVDL such that X = ϕ M .
• There is a sentence of existential second order logic, ESO, σ such that
Remember that X(x) is the relation corresponding to the team X.
3.1. Multivalued dependence, independence and completeness. In a recent paper by Grädel and Väänänen [9] independence atoms are introduced:
This atom also applies to termst ⊥st ′ by a slight change of the definition.
As easily seen, we have M, X [x։ȳ] iff M, X ȳ ⊥xz wherez = dom(X) \ {x,ȳ }. The logic we get when adding independence atoms to first order logic is called Independence logic.
The independence relation introduced by Grädel and Väänänen is in the database theory community known as the embedded multivalued depencency. It is usually denoted by [x։ȳ|z] .
Let us use the notation D ϕ, where D is a (finite) set of dependence atoms (functional, multivalued or embedded multivalued) and ϕ is a single dependence atom (of the same kind) to mean that any team X (over any domain) satisfying all the dependencies in D also satisfies ϕ. It is well known that functional dependence is axiomatizable: 
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We are assuming that allx,ȳ, andz are variables in U .
However the embedded multivalued dependency is not axiomatizable as was shown by Sagiv and Walecka in the following sense: Proposition 3.11 ([20] ). There is no finite set of inference rules, where each inference rule is a recursive set of k-tuples of embedded multivalued dependencies, axiomatizing the consequence relation D ϕ for embedded multivalued dependencies.
This answers an open question stated in [9] . Galliani recently observed that X t ⊥st ′ iff
whereū is the domain of X. Thus, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 3.12 ( [7] ). The multivalued Dependence logic has the same strength as Independence logic, even at the level of formulas.
Thus the definable sets of teams of both Independence logic and multivalued Dependence logic is exactly the sets of teams definable by existential second order sentences.
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have given truth conditions for monotone generalized quantifiers in logics using team semantics in such a way that the meaning of L(Q)-formulas remain the same when moving to team semantics, i.e., a team satisfies a formula of L(Q) iff every assignment in the team satisfies the formula. It is also shown that the truth conditions in a natural way can be extended to deal with relations of dependence and independence between the quantifiers, in such a way that branching of two quantifiers Q 1 and Q 2 can be expressed by a linear quantifier prefix: Q 1 xQ 2 y/ x.
We also gave truth conditions for non-monotone quantifiers by using an idea from Sher in [21] to add a largeness or maximality condition. For this condition the quantifier prefix Q 1 xQ 2 y/x comes close to the branching Br S (Q 1 , Q 2 )xy defined in [21] , but they are not equivalent: In the prefix Q 1 xQ 2 y/x the second quantifier depends on the first in a weak sense, however in the case of Br S (Q 1 , Q 2 )xy there is full symmetry in the sense that Br S (Q 1 , Q 2 )xy is equivalent to Br S (Q 2 , Q 1 )yx. Is there some way of treating the maximaility principle of Sher, Br S (Q 1 , Q 2 ), in a compositional way in the framework used in this paper? Can other proposed principles, e.g. the one in [23] , of branching in the non-monotone case be handled compositional in the same way?
The question of whether the notion of dependence and independence of (monotone) quantifiers can be handled on the atomic level is answered positively in the paper. However, the notion of dependence is not the functional dependence of Dependence logic, but rather a new kind of dependence atom, called multivalued dependence. This atom is not closed under taking subteams, but can be used to express branching of generalized quantifiers, which the functional dependence atom cannot: Br(Q 1 , Q 2 )xy is equivalent to Q 1 xQ 2 y([։y] ∧ . . .).
If a monotone quantifier Q is definable in ESO, i.e., there is an ESO sentence σ such that M σ iff M ∈ Q, then it is easy to see that the strength on sentence level of the logic SBL(Q) is just the strength of existential second order logic, ESO. This comes from the fact that SBL ≡ ESO and by observing that for any formula ϕ of SBL(Q) we can find a sentence σ of ESO such that M, X ϕ iff (M, X(x)) σ. This is done by coding the truth conditions of ϕ into the sentence σ. Thus, SBL(Q) ≡ SBL but the translation of SBL(Q) sentences into SBL is non-compositional.
For which quantifiers Q are there compositional translations of SBL(Q) into SBL? In particular, is there a compositional translation of SBL(Q 0 ) into SBL, where Q 0 is the quantifier "there exists infinitely many"?
Of course we have not answered one of the basic questions regarding our definition of generalized quantifiers: When introducing a monotone quantifier, which may not be definable in ESO, into Dependence logic, what is the strength of the resulting logic?
In connection with investigating the strength of these kinds of logics it might be worth mentioning Krynicki's result in [15] saying that there is a single quantifier Q of type 4 such that every IF-logic sentence is equivalent to a sentence of L(Q) over every structure with a pairing function. Is this also true for SBL(Q), i.e., is there a single quantifier Q ′ such that any sentence of SBL(Q) is equivalent to a sentence of L(Q ′ ) over any structure with a pairing function?
There is a connection of multivalued dependence with category theory through pullbacks, or fibered products. Proposition 3.4 gives a characterization of multivalued dependence in terms of natural join, which in turn has a characterization in terms of pullbacks:
In the category of teams, where the objects are teams and the morphisms are functions between teams, the natural join of X and Y is the pullback of X and Y over Z = (X↾z) ∩ (Y ↾z), wherez is dom(X) ∩ dom(Y ). More precisely; letx and y be dom(X) and dom(Y ) respectively, then the following is a pullback diagram: X↾x wherez is dom(X) \ {x,ȳ }, is a pullback. This suggests that there might be more, and deeper, connections between team semantics and category theory.
